Claude Code runs forbidden destructive git commands twice in one session, ignoring its own written rule
Anthropic (Claude Code) · Mar 23, 2026 · Coding agent
What happened
The filer reported Claude Code ran git checkout -- on the working branch twice in one session, destroying hours of uncommitted manual edits across 30+ files. The second run came 30 minutes after Claude had written a memory rule forbidding itself from ever running that command. The report's conclusion: advisory rules in CLAUDE.md or memory do not prevent destructive actions.
Causal vector
Self-imposed policy stored as context could not override the model's in-task judgment; no hard gate existed on destructive git operations
Source
Reported by GitHub issue, anthropics/claude-code #37888. Verified against the primary report.
The agent broke its own rule because a rule it writes is still just text in context. sipi.bot enforces policy at the action boundary: destructive git operations are a FLAGGED category requiring human approval, independent of what the model promised in prose.
The six rule types that contain this class of failure
Per-transaction cap
Any single spend above your ceiling is BLOCKED before it moves.
Daily total
Cumulative spend across all agent calls, bounded per day.
Velocity limit
Stops runaway retry loops — the #1 cause of overnight losses.
Merchant allowlist
Only approved destinations can ever receive funds.
Category rules
Flag high-risk classes (crypto, infra, refunds) for review.
Approval threshold
Above a value, the action waits for a human.
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